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socio-political vacuum: beyond the reach of ideology and the relations of power
supported by it. Based on the insights provided by the classical works of Walter
Benjamin and Jean Baudrillard on the visual construction of reality, I argue that
an  authoritative  discussion  of  the  cultural,  social  and political  implications  of
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of control  associated  with  it.  My main  point  is  that  in  Western  societies,  the
actualization  of the subversive potential  of digital  visuality,  as well  as that  of
other  forms  of  communication,  requires  material  conditions  that  depend  on
ideology rather than technology.  These ideological conditions explain why, for
example,  digital  visuality  may  be  effective  in  the  cultural  and  socio-political
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extensive subcultural uses of digital visuality, the subversive potential is fatally
reduced (if not nullified) by mechanisms that can be subsumed in what Frederic
Jameson called  “the cultural  logic  of  late  capitalism”.  In support  of  my main
argument,  I  offer  some  preliminary  reflections  on  the  media  coverage  of  the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the uses of organized violence in the “Arab Spring”
of 2011.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is part of a larger study on the power of visual communication. Here I would like
to address the issue of digital visuality, a specific but nowadays seemingly dominant form of
visual communication, and the nature or direction of the power allegedly associated to it. The
question then is: what is the “power” of digital visuality; and what are its effects on politics
(the competition for the control over the distribution on power in society)? I believe this
question is core in any attempt to assess the socio-cultural implications of innovation and
technological development in communication. 
In order to locate my discussion within broader conceptual coordinates, I should mention that
my approach rejects technological determinism and what, in lack of a better term, I would
describe as the contemplative tradition in visual analysis. 
Perspectives  inspired  by  technological  determinism  usually  consider  communication  or
media technology as the source of change or the cause of social phenomena that catch the
attention of the analysts.  The problem with these perspectives is that by explaining social
change  with  technological  development,  they  induce  the  naïve  student  to  believe  that
technological development  itself  is not part  of the social  world. Far from being a neutral
force,  technological  development  is  a  core  process  that  contains  and reflects  ideological
assumptions  concerning  the  distribution  of  power  in  society.  In  my  view,  technological
development  and social  change are interconnected and the evolution of both is fueled by
politics: the competition for the control over the distribution of values in society. 
The  contemplative  tradition  to  visual  communication  constructs  the  power  of  visual
communication in terms of a relationship between the image and the viewer, to study how
and why this relationship changes in society. In the formulation of W. J. T. Mitchell, “double
consciousness” is a key concept in this approach. It expresses the idea that, although very few
of us would believe that images are living things, still many more of us relate to images as if
they  were  indeed  alive  (Mitchell,  2005,  p.  11).  From the  “philosophical  argument”  that
“images are like living organisms”, this approach sets to ask:
If the living image has always been the subject of a double consciousness, of simultaneous belief
and disavowal, what conditions are making the disavowal more difficult to maintain today? Why,
in other words, do various forms of “iconoclash” – the war of images – seem so conspicuously a
part of the pictorial turn in our time? (Mitchell, 2005, p. 11) 
This approach points to an important question (why are images seemingly more important
today than in the past?) but, as I argued elsewhere, it does so in the wrong way. By adopting
the metaphor of “live images” and inciting the viewer to pay attention to “what do pictures
want?” it falls prey to a fundamental attribution error: it looks for causes, reasons, motives
etc. in the tools rather than in their users; in the objects rather than in the agent; and in things
rather than in humans. As technological determinism, but in a more sophisticated way, this
approach  seems  unsuitable  for  the  analysis  of  relations  of  power  because  in  the  “visual
construction of the social” (Mitchell, 2005, p. 356), human agency remains hidden and the
ideological origins of social change ultimately out of intellectual reach.  
In my approach, the emancipative potential of visual forms of expression does not reside in
technology or in photography, and therefore not in digital visuality. Rather it depends on the
material and immaterial conditions that assist, support or hinder the effective usage of visual
KOME − An International Journal of Pure Communication Inquiry, Volume 2 Issue 2,  1-16.
Stocchetti, M.                                                                                                                           3 
communication by human agents in the competition for the control over the distribution of
values in society. 
First, I will discuss the limits of three main arguments that can be made in support of the
emancipative potential of digital visuality. Second, with the help of a few insights from the
works of Walter Benjamin and Jean Baudrillard, among others, I will give a closer look at the
role  of  ideology  and  ideological  apparatus  in  resolving  the  indeterminacy  of  visual
communication. Finally, I will describe this role at work in the coverage of the invasion of
Iraq in 2003 and of the “Arab Spring” in 2011. 
2. THE EMANCIPATIVE ARGUMENT 
The belief that digital visuality may indeed have important emancipative potentialities can
presumably  be  based  on  at  least  three  types  of  arguments  concerning  political  dissent,
information and the formation of visual communities. 
2.1. Supporting voices of dissent and the circulation of “visual evidence” 
A generic but widespread argument in support of digital visuality is the belief that this form
of communication distinctively supports, incites, facilitates or otherwise helps the expression
of societal “voices” of individuals and groups which are marginalized by mainstream media.
A more specific argument along these lines is that digital visuality facilitates the production
and circulation of visual evidence concerning abuses committed by oppressive regimes that
can  exert  an  effective  control  on  institutional  media.  In  this  idea,  the  power  of  visual
communication   (based  on something  I  would  like  to  call  “reality  principle”  and digital
visuality),  creates  the  conditions  for  simultaneity  and  ubiquity:  we  can  know  what  is
happening everywhere in the world at the same time it is happening. I am sure that few of us
would disagree that it would be nice if oppressive regimes could be subverted by the mere
circulation of visual evidence of their dark deeds. The widespread possibility of showing and
watching abuses committed every minute in every corner of the world does not translate
automatically  or  necessarily  into  the  possibility  to  do  something  about  it.  The  political
mobilization against systematic abusive behavior requires not only knowledge about these
abuses  and  will  to  oppose  them,  but  also  political  resources  (e.g.  force)  and  a  political
organization  able  to  make  effective  use  of  that  knowledge  and  those  resources.  More
commonly,  this type of visual evidence is used by other regimes, including democracy, to
mobilize consensus against the perpetrator. In this respect, rather than promoting awareness
and dissidence,  digital  visuality  simply  facilitates  the  usage  of  visual  communication  for
political propaganda. Its efficacy does not reflect the “power of images” or their relation to
truth, but the political strength of the political organization using it. More precisely, while the
efficacy of visual communication depends on its effective usage by a political organization,
the emancipative potential of this form of communication depends on the goals or interests of
the same political organizations. From this perspective, it would seem that (digital) visual
communication is able to perform equally well to subvert oppressive as well as democratic
regimes, to tell or to hide the truth, to support or to manipulate political “voice”. For good or
bad, visual evidence becomes politically relevant if and when it is effectively used by an
influential political organization. We will see in a moment how this perspective may indeed
provide some useful insights if applied to the visual coverage of the so called “Arab Spring”. 
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If emancipation is discussed as a political process or phenomenon (and not for example a
psychological  one)  digital  visuality  appears  to  be  neither  a  sufficient  nor  a  necessary
condition. The belief in its emancipative power seems rather to reflect a rather naïve idea of
what politics is all about and a dramatic underestimation of political pragmatics: the complex
interplay  of  material  and immaterial  conditions  affecting  the  capacity  of  individuals  and
groups to  participate  to the competition for the control  over the distribution of values in
society.  At  best,  and discounting  political  propaganda,  digital  visuality can be a  form of
political  communication  that,  as  communication  in  general,  is  indeed  a  fundamental
dimension of democratic participation. 
Finally, I would also like to add that the mobilizing effect of images of abuses should not be
taken for granted.  Like all  images,  these have ambivalent  meanings  and, therefore,  roles.
Images of victims of a car accident, for example, may be used to invite caution in driving.
They also feature prominently in websites that offer those for the visual pleasure of a morbid
audience. The same happened with the images of Abu Ghraib. 
2.2. Creating the “imagined” community as a political actor 
A more interesting belief concerning the emancipative potential of digital visuality reflects
the idea that images are a form of text with a distinctive emotional capacity.  In the right
conditions, images can create feelings of belonging and identification that ultimately result in
forms of collective behavior that are politically relevant – e.g. transforming a more or less
loose  group  of  separate  individuals  in  a  political  organization.  While  in  the  previous
argument the power of visual communication resided in what I called the “reality principle”
(the belief that images can give access to a hidden aspect of reality and hidden truth) in this
argument I think what we are dealing with is something I would call the “pleasure principle”.
The idea here is that digital visuality facilitates the circulation of images that for a variety of
reasons fulfill desires of belonging, participation, identification etc. that alternative forms of
communication leave somehow frustrated. Furthermore, digitalization enables and accelerates
the circulation of images across material and immaterial obstacles (such as borders, cultures,
language, status, gender, etc.) to more conventional forms of communication. This argument
seems convincing, on political grounds, because the idea of a community of (visual) meaning
is compatible with the theorization of collective identity famously formulated by Benedict
Anderson and, perhaps less famously, with the “puissance” of the “tribes” as described by
Michel  Maffesoli (Maffesoli,  1996).  These  groups  are  then  supposed  to  be  politically
influential, bringing to the fore issues (e.g. gay rights) which are neglected by conventional
political actors (e.g. political parties based on class identity) hence contributing to increase
the inclusiveness of  the political system.
In this argument, the political role of digital visuality is more indirect, but also possibly more
influential.  Implicit  in  the  recognition  of  the  emotional  appeal  of  visual  communication,
however, is also the ambivalence of this appeal. It is supportive of emancipation as well as of
oppression. If the advantage of visuality as a form of political communication - compared to
e.g. written communication - consists in its greater emotional appeal, the problem here is to
see if  and to  what  extent  the  politics  of  emotions  can  foster  or  undermine  emancipative
potentialities  –  or  simply  democratic  politics.  In  fact,  since  digital  visuality  can  support
minority rights as well as neo-Nazi and other forms of fundamentalism, this line of argument
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is  convincing  about  the  political  relevance  of  digital  visuality  but  cannot  dissolve  the
ambivalence of its emancipative potential.
From a different perspective, the political relevance of these communities of meaning and,
therefore,  of  “digital”  visuality  can  be  criticized  arguing  that  the  imagined  communities
described by Benedict  Anderson were  “creatures”  that  could  still  prosper  in  the  political
condition of modernity. Today, in the digital age, the postmodern condition had profoundly
altered not only the nature of politics but, more radically, the very saliency of meaning and
the nature of the real.  
With  Jean-Françoise  Lyotard,  for  example,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  condition  of
disenchantment undermines the very possibility of institutionalization of a set of common
meanings/beliefs into a ‘grand narrative’ capable of generating organized collective action.
As Maffesoli notes:
The  major  characteristics  attributed  to  these  emotional  communities  are  their  ephemeral
aspect;  ‘changeable  composition’;  ‘ill-defined  nature’;  local  flavour;  their  ‘lack  of
organization’ and routinization (Veralltäglichung). (Maffesoli, 1996, p. 12)
Even if digital visuality can create a community of meaning, there are legitimate reasons of
doubt concerning the actual capacity of these communities to support emancipation. In fact,
in  postmodernism,  there  are  reasons  to  doubt  that  not  only digital  visuality  but  even its
meaning itself could be politically relevant, if one has to believe Frederic Jameson when he
writes that:
Now  reference  and  reality  disappear  altogether,  and  even  meaning  –  the  signified  –  is
problematized.  We  are  left  with  that  pure  and  random  play  of  signifiers  that  we  call
postmodernism,  which  no  longer  produces  monumental  works  of  the  modernist  type  but
ceaselessly reshuffles the fragments of pre-existent text, the building blocks of older cultural
and social production, in some new and heightened bricolage: metabooks which cannibalize
other books, metatexts which collate bits of other texts – such is the logic of postmodernism
in general, which find one of its strongest and most original, authentic forms in the new art of
experimental video. (Jameson, 1991, p. 96)
In  sum,  the  problem  with  this  indirect  political  role  of  digital  visuality  can  be  called
“indeterminacy”. The enactment of emancipative potential is far from granted because digital
visuality  happens  to  perform community  building  functions  in  times  when  conventional
political communication and identities have lost their currency, and, more radically, even the
notion of meaning itself becomes problematic. It should be clear that this situation does not,
per se, rule out the possibility of emancipative usage of digital visuality. It just requires, by
those who want to give it a try, a more accurate assessment of the current state of affairs. 
2.3. Changing the social construction of reality (and of the political within
it) 
A third argument in favor of the emancipative potential of digital visuality may suggest that
this form of visual communication can indeed foster political emancipation by introducing
fundamental changes in the process of the social construction of reality - a process famously
described by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman. The question here is then to see what is the
nature of these changes,  and what  are  the foreseeable political  implications  associated to
them.
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If digital visuality cannot credibly reduce the indeterminacy of visual communication in its
conventional functions of political propaganda and community building, one may still claim
that, compared to conventional photography, digital visuality affects the social construction
of reality in at least three ways. First, it opens up the practice of visual communication to
large  parts  of  the  population,  blurring  the  distinction  between  producer,  distributor  and
consumer  of  visual  objects  (the  apparent  “democratization”  of  visual  communication,  a
process  that  Benjamins  discussed  about  film  and  one  I  will  discuss  further  in  the  next
section).  Second, it  enhances the productive capacity  of visual technology beyond reality
itself,  into the hyper-real  by enabling the production of images  that transcend the human
perspective (like viewing the war with the “eyes” of a missile,  a point discussed by Jean
Baudrillard that I will revisit in a moment). Third, it performs as a logic for the representation
of  reality  that  has  pedagogical  implications,  and  enhances  the  social  value  of  visual
communication in the social construction of reality (a message must be visual if it has to be
relevant at all!) independently from reality itself.
The combined effects of these three changes introduced by digital visuality, one may suggest,
are ‘emancipative’ on political  grounds to the extent that their  role is ‘subversive’ of the
social  construction  of  reality.  Political  emancipation,  in  other  words,  is  associated  to  the
dissolution  of  the  relations  of  power  legitimized  by notions  of  truth  and reality  that  are
effectively challenged by the logic of digital visuality, the hyperrealism of its representations,
and the widespread access to both. To change the world, one should first change the way we
look at it. Digital visuality can help in looking at the world not as it is, but as it could be
(utopia/dystopia).
This  argument  is  presumably  the  most  sophisticated  of  the  three  discussed  here.  In  this
perspective,  the  power  of  visual  communication  goes  beyond  information  to  stretch  into
knowledge, and, in particular, into the process of knowledge construction about the social
world. Additionally, in this  argument, the emancipative claim of digital visuality does not
address the political directly but indirectly, blending socio-constructivism and media ecology
in  what  appears  a  promising  step  towards  a  political  theory  of  visual  politics.  The  core
conceptual move here is the idea that reality is constructed by social communication (socio-
constructivism), and that if communication is relevant, the ways we communicate must make
a difference in the way reality is constructed and, maybe, in the nature of it (media ecology).
Finally,  this argument introduces the themes of the crisis of truth,  and the substitution of
reality by its representations, which are two core aspects of Postmodernism, but it also invites
a  critical  reflection  on  the  political  shortcomings  of  this  form  of  criticism,  and  on  the
intellectual possibility to overcome them. 
My claim, in relation to the emancipative potential of digital visuality as described in this
argument, can be summarized as follows. If digital visuality supports the dissolution of the
real, the impact on the relations of power depends on the way we construe the conceptual
linkage between reality and politics. If politics is constructed as a result of, and dependent
upon, reality, then the subversion of reality is the subversion of the political. Conventional
processes  and  identities  lose  their  meanings  e.g.  election,  class  struggle,  etc.  This
“subversion” however, rather than opening up opportunities for emancipation, seems to be
what Jean Baudrillard described as a regime of simulation: a situation in which relations of
power are beyond the reach of change. Visual communication with all its ambivalence, and
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because of it,  is  a most  effective tool  to manage relations  of power through –rather than
despite - the subversion of the real.
But if politics is seen as a process that construes reality, and the social construction of reality
as a fundamental dimension of the competition over the control for the distribution of values
in the society (as I am inclined to believe), then the subversion of the real is not ‘outside’ the
domain of politics, but an important part of it, a more or less deliberate move to affect this
competition. 
Michel Foucault already pointed out the productive capacity of power/knowledge to create
the meanings or “discoursive formations” necessary for the reproduction of control. Where
the cultural logic of late capitalism applies,  if the incessant production of new meanings is
constitutive  of relations  of power,  as Frederic  Jameson suggests,  these relations  may not
dissolve  because  the  symbols  and  rituals  expressing  them are  deprived  of  meaning  (e.g.
through  the  autonomy  of  the  signifier).  Rather,  in  these  conditions,  the  possibility  of
emancipative changes is disconnected from the social construction of meaning: it is beyond
the reach of change through communication – and this is “the violence of the system” that
Baudrillard  believed  generated  terrorism as  a  form of  antagonistic  violence.  [Baudrillard
2003 (2002), p. 58]
If digital  visuality contributes to shatter the myth of truth in visual communication to the
advantage of the “pleasure principle” political  emancipation becomes as illusionary as the
beauty of a computer generated landscape we may enjoy while we sit in a room without
windows, or a digital fireplace burning on our TV screen.
If we believe that reality is socially constructed, we should also give some currency to at least
other  two ideas.  First,  that  the  control  on  the  social  construction  of  reality  is  unequally
distributed  in  society  and  therefore,  that  some  groups  are  more  influential  than  others.
Second, that technological evolution is also part of this reality and also influenced by, rather
than merely having influence upon, the unequal distribution of power in society. What this
means for our discussion is that the emancipative claim of digital visuality can indeed be seen
in a broader perspective, as a form of communication that affects the social construction of
reality, rather than directly the relation of power within it. But it also means that the social
effects  of  digital  visuality  are  mediated  by  other  circumstances  and  conditions  that
presumably,  to  a  certain  extent,  reflect  relations  of  power.  It  is  this  mediation,  one may
suggest, that ultimately produces the elements of ambivalence in the emancipative promise of
digital  visuality:  the  indeterminacy  in  the  role  of  images,  visual  community  and
representation of the political that I have discussed here.   
In my view, this line of argument invites reflection on the role of ideology or, more precisely,
on  the  role  of  institutionalized  hierarchies  of  values  on  the  social  uses  of  available
technologies for visual communication.  
3. DIGITAL VISUALITY AND IDEOLOGY
In the previous section I challenged the ideas that images or visual technology can bring
about  emancipation.  In the discussion of three  arguments  in  support  of  the emancipative
claim of digital visuality I tried to argue that indeterminacy is the key feature of this role,
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referring to a set of possibilities the implementation of which seems to rely upon, much more
than bring about, change in established relations of power.
In discussing the role of ideology, I want to suggest that the emancipative potential of digital
visuality  (as  other  communication  technologies)  depends  on  effective  usage,  and  that
effective usage depends on the capacity of the user to come to terms with (or acknowledge)
the  conditions  affecting  its  usage.  Most  relevant,  among  these  conditions,  are  the
institutionalized  hierarchies  of  values  that  more  or  less  latently  affect  the  uses  of  digital
visuality, like other forms of expression.
Therefore, I define ideology as an institutionalized hierarchy of value performing descriptive
and prescriptive functions in the competition over the distribution of values in society.
Looking  at  this  concept  of  ideology  is  important,  in  my  opinion,  to  defamiliarize  our
experience  of  media  and  communication,  to  become  aware  of  the  risks  associated  to
unreflective  ways  of  engaging  with  technology  in  general,  and  visual  technology  in
particular. This is an exercise with a pedagogical connotation that I believe is necessary to
resist  the  pervasiveness  of  the  “promotional  cultural”  and  the  fact  that  this  culture  “has
become, today, virtually co-extensive with our produced symbolic world” (Wernick, 1991, p.
182) – a process that in political perspective goes dangerously close to the saturation of the
symbolic imaginary by corporate interests1. 
To address the emancipative potential of digital visuality I therefore suggest another line of
argument – digital visuality is a (political) form of communication that participates (reflects,
affects, etc.) with the ideological conditions of a given society. 
Within the limits  of this paper I will briefly recall  some ideas expressed in the works of
Walter Benjamin and Jean Baudrillard that are useful for identifying the ideological elements
embedded in digital visuality. After this, I will use these ideas for a preliminary interpretation
of the visual coverage of the Iraq invasion and “Arab Spring”.
3.1. Walter Benjamin and the role of technological reproducibility  
I believe we are all familiar with the celebrated work of Walter Benjamin on the mechanical
reproducibility of the work of art. My main point here is that mechanical reproducibility is
not a process that can be considered ideologically neutral. While I believe that Benjamin is
fundamentally right concerning the cultural and socio-political implications of this feature, I
think he is however wrong when he suggests the possibility of using the potential of film in
support  of  revolutionary  culture,  to  subvert  property  relations,  and  ultimately  satisfy  the
human “reproductive”  need.  Past history simply shows that  this  has not happened,  and I
cannot see, in contemporary history,  any reason why we should expect to experience this
subversive turn anytime soon. In fact, the filmic power of the “apparatus” seems stronger
than ever, spreading from the large to the small screen of TV, and to the even smaller screen
of personal computers, in form of online movies, video on demand and videogames. Digital
visuality  may facilitate  the diversification  of  delivery platforms,  but  not  the pluralism of
1 An example is the use of images in mobile communication, a form of technology that, as I argued with Mikko
Villi is far from ‘connecting people’ but makes absence productive in the management of social space. (Villi &
Stocchetti, 2011)
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ideological functions. These functions are those that Benjamin described in his article and it
may be useful recall them today. 
First, mechanical reproducibility effaces the role of tradition, destroys the aura of the work of
art, its “cult value”, but enhances its “exhibition value”. Hence it creates the conditions for
the politics of art: the use of aesthetics in the competition for the control over the distribution
of values in society. (Benjamin, 2008, p. 25) 
Second, in the politics of art, mechanical reproducibility allows for the possibility to establish
a distinctive relationship between difference and similarity,  in which perception “extracts
sameness even from what is unique”. In the process of social construction of reality discussed
earlier, mechanical reproducibility makes it possible to enforce “the alignment of reality with
the masses and of the masses with reality … a process of immeasurable importance for both
thinking and perception”. (Benjamin, 2008, pp. 23-24). 
Third, the relevance of mechanical  reproducibility is not primarily in the kind of (visual)
products it creates, but rather in the social functions that are attributed to these products. In
this perspective, the training functions that Benjamin sees for film applies equally well, in my
view, to videogames and digital photography:
The function of film is to train human beings in the apperceptions and reactions needed to deal with a
vast apparatus whose role in their lives is expanding almost daily… The representation of human
beings by means of an apparatus has made possible a highly productive use of the human being’s
self-alienation. (Benjamin, 2008, p. 26 and 32)
Fourth, even before digitalization (and the idea of “simulation” in Baudrillard),  Benjamin
describes  the  ideological  function  of  film  in  term of  “adaptation”  between  the  people’s
perception of themselves, and the world around them, and the needs of the apparatus (in
Baudrillard, “the system”) achieved through the blurring of the difference between reality
and its representations: 
The most important social function of film is to establish equilibrium between human beings and the
apparatus. Film achieves this goal not only in terms of man’s presentation of himself to the camera
but also in terms of his representation of his environment by means of this apparatus. (…)  This is
where the camera comes into play, with all its resources for swooping and rising, disrupting and
isolating, stretching or compressing a sequence, enlarging or reducing an object. It  is through the
camera that we first discover the optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious
through psychoanalysis. (Benjamin, 2008, p. 37) (Italics in the original)
Fifth, mechanical reproducibility (of which digital visuality is just the latest expression) is a
form of control over the representation of reality. This control, however, is not ideologically
neutral but rather selective. While Benjamin notes that the functioning of the (ideological)
apparatus effectively nullified the emancipative or “revolutionary”  opportunities in film, I
claim that the same apparatus performs in a similar way in the other domains, where digital
visuality  has  been  put  to  work  (namely  videogames,  advertisement  and  the  practices
associated to private photography). 
Film capital uses the revolutionary opportunities implied by this control for counterrevolutionary
purposes.  Not  only does  the  cult  of  the  movie  star  which  it  fosters  preserve  that  magic  of  the
personality which has long been no more than the putrid magic of its own commodity character, but
its counterpart, the cult of the audience, reinforces the corruption by which fascism is seeking to
supplant the class consciousness of the masses. (Benjamin, 2008, p. 33)
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Sixth, intrinsic in this control is the possibility of bringing about a perception of reality, and
to  naturalize  representations  of  the  world  that,  albeit  psychotic  per  se,  are  enforced  as
authoritative representations of reality:
Many of the deformations and stereotypes, transformations and catastrophes which can assail
the optical world in films afflict the actual world in psychoses, hallucinations, and dreams.
Thanks to the camera, therefore, the individual perceptions of the psychotic or the dreamer
can be appropriated by collective perception. The ancient truth expressed by Heraclitus, that
those who are awake have a world in common while each sleeper has a world of his own, has
been  invalidated by film – and less  by depicting the dream world itself  than by creating
figures of collective dream, such as the globe-encircling Mickey Mouse. (Benjamin, 2008, pp.
37-38)
Seventh, for Benjamin, in capitalist and fascist societies, film is the masses’ “true training
ground”  for  “reception  in  distraction”  as  the  form  of  apperception  which  leads  to  the
aesthetization of politics and, ultimately, to war as strategies to preserve property relations. 
The  logical  outcome  of  fascism  is  an  aestheticizing  of  political  life  (…)  All  efforts  to
aestheticize politics culminate in one point. That one point is war. War and only war, makes it
possible to set a goal for mass movements on the grandest scale while preserving traditional
property relations. That is how the situation presents itself in political terms. In technological
terms it can be formulated as follows: only war makes it possible to mobilize all of today’s
technological resources while maintaining property relations. (Benjamin, 2008, p. 41) (Italics
in the original)
We will  see  in  a  moment  that  Benjamin’s  insight  about  aestheticization  and  war  sound
especially actual in relation to the visual coverage of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and in the
“Arab Spring” in 2011. 
What makes Benjamins analysis on the socio-political effects of technological reproducibility
of the work of art a bit obsolete, in my view, is his faith on the possibility for communist
ideology to re-appropriate the revolutionary potential of film and the idea, closely associated
to this, that the ideological effects of film could be reversed and even put to good use for the
emancipation of the masses. As we know, Soviet Communism relied on film for “stimulating
the involvement of the masses through illusionary displays” (Benjamin, 2008, p. 34) very
much like “film capital” does, exposing the masses to the same aesthetization of politics that
Benjamin discusses in capitalist society. If Benjamin would write today, he would perhaps
acknowledge that capitalism is an ideology more resilient and ultimately effective than he
thought – and maybe that visual communication is a less effective emancipative tool than he
hoped. 
3.2. Jean Baudrillard and the regime of simulation
There are at least two ideas that are relevant here: simulacra and simulation. Like Benjamin,
Baudrillard believes that a crucial moment consists in the disappearance of difference (e.g.
between the ‘map’ and the ‘territory’) (Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, [1985] 1994,
p. 2). If the emancipative potential  of digital visuality is assessed in relation to the social
construction of reality, the mechanical reproducibility of images that have “no relation to any
reality whatsoever”  (Baudrillard,  [1985] 1994, p. 6) should raise some concern.  While  in
Benjamin the manipulative potential of film (and I argue of digital visuality too) is bent to the
need of the reproduction of reality along ideological lines, with Baudrillard the process gets
out of control. Media is not a tool to control reality but to substitute it. The substitution itself
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is not part of an ideological program, such as that of the capitalist or the fascist, but a result of
the representational logic of the media itself. 
Baudrillard suggests that this state of affairs, the effective substitution of the real with its
mediated representation, implies the end of the political since the possibility of change, in a
“regime” of simulation is simply ruled out. My suggestion here is rather that this “regime”
has itself  ideological connotations,  and, independently from the (im)possibility of change,
this  state  of  affairs  is  indeed  the  result  of  politics:  the  practical  effect  of  an  hegemonic
ideology on the social construction of the world.
The  value  of  Baudrillard’s  ideas  lies,  in  my  opinion,  in  the  insight  it  may  offer  when
identifying the deep effects of mechanical reproducibility on the cultures of perception. The
limit, however, is its  incapacity to see the effects he describes as a state of affairs belonging
to the social world, and therefore, associated to identifiable interests and agents. 
To the extent that the use of images as simulacra and the “regime” of simulation associated to
it are constitutive of the postmodern condition, this very “condition” is not politically neutral
and assuredly far from emancipative. As Jameson put it rather unambiguously: 
Yet this is the point at which I must remind the reader of the obvious: namely, that this whole
global, yet American, postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural expression of a
whole new wave of American military and economic domination throughout the world: in this
sense, as throughout class history, the underside of culture is blood, torture, death, and terror.
(Jameson, 1991, p. 5)
I can therefore suggest that the visual strategy of hegemonic capitalism is presumably the
following: the control of the social construction of reality by blurring the difference between
reality and simulation, by making images simulacra and therefore destroying the possibility
of effective usage of visual communication for subversion. 
4.  THE  SOCIAL  CONSTRUCTION  OF  REALITY  AND  THE  EMANCIPATIVE
POTENTIAL OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION 
4.1. Iraq 1991-2003 
There is little doubt that, in the US-led invasion of Iraq, digital visuality was the weapon of
choice  in  psychological  warfare.  The point  was even made  explicit  by one  of  the  many
“analysts” involved in the war reporting exercise2. The targets  of this warfare, however, were
not only the Iraqi people and their army, but also the Western people. Domestic audiences
were involved in that war in the role of spectators and funders, but also masses in the process
of being trained to conform to the needs of the ruling class (if we follow Benjamin) and
ultimately persuaded to buy into the myth of the monopoly of legitimate force by the US, if
we follow Baudrillard  (Baudrillard, 1991, p. 96).
2 During the early hours of the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003, commenting for th CNN International  the
computer generated images of the invasion plans, retired US General Dan Christian quite candidly observed that
“the  coalition  forces  would  not  allow this  kind  of  broadcasting  were  it  not  to  be  used  for  psychological
influencing as well”. (CNN World, 21 March 2003 at 06:16 GMT)
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That war, possibly more than any other in the past, was construed as a visual “work of art”
whose main goal was to bring the viewers to enjoy what they saw. It was a huge, costly and
successful experiment in institutional control over the social construction of a specific reality
(war). The cognitive strategy used to achieve this control consisted in blurring the distinction
between reality and the communicative representation of it. The role of visual communication
was to provide visual evidence in support of institutional claims. Colin Powell’s presentation
of the “evidence”  in  support  of the US administration’s  claim that  Saddam Hussein was
indeed in possession of weapons of mass destruction was not a diplomatic farce, but rather a
public rehearsal of this communicative strategy 3.  The visual coverage of the actual war was
performed as a theatrical show in which live broadcast, computer generated simulations, and
images compilations had  the main communicative function of transforming the war into a
visual product for leisure consumption. 
As Mirzoeff observed: 
For  all  the  deconstructive,  feminist,  anti-racist,  visual  culture  theory  that  I  have  at  my
disposal, there was no way to counter the sweating, exulting triumph of the war watcher. To
call attention to the deaths of Iraqi civilians or to mention that this attack lacked the authority
of the United Nations would simply have added to his delight. (Mirzoeff, 2005, pp. 1-2)
The political implications of constructing war as an object of visual pleasure (or as “war porn,
(Baudrillard,  2006))  are  huge,  if  one   thinks  about  it.  It  is  this  form of  enjoyment,  for
example,  that  produces  the  emotional  conditions  for  the  transformation  of  a  democratic
regime in a “garrison state” – a transformation described by Harold D. Lasswell already in
the 1940s.
The war coverage of the invasion of Iraq in BBC World and CNN International produced the
aesthetization of war on a global scale, for a global audience, across cultures and irrespective
of the diversities among “visual cultures”. It is trivial to say that this would not have been
possible  without  digital  technology.  Less  trivial  may  be  to  discuss  the  non-material
conditions that made it possible. My suggestion, in this respect, is that an exercise in the
aesthetization of war of that magnitude is both a sign and a tool: a sign (indicator) of the
ideological  strength of  global  capitalism;  and a  tool  to  enforce  intellectual  and cognitive
deterrence against  competing  ideologies.  A visual coverage of that  sort  was possible  and
intelligible because global audiences had already been trained – so to say – in that type of
spectacleby the flood of mainstream war movies and video games that shared the same digital
technology. Furthermore, and to the extent that war coverage was effectively experienced and
consumed by a  great  number  of people as a work of art  for  mass  visual  enjoyment,  the
aesthetization of war succeed in creating the cognitive basis for the legitimization of the same
ideology. This is a good example, in my opinion, of how ideology determines the usage of
available  technology,  and  how  the  ideological  usage  of  available  technology  supports
ideology itself. 
The  ultimate  piece  of  evidence  for  an  argument  against  the  emancipative  role  of  digital
technology based on the “reality principle” comes from the publication of the images of the
abuse committed by US personnel on war prisoners at Abu-Ghraib. 
Once established (by the symbolic  authority of transnational  TV networks),  the idea that
violence can be experienced as a form of visual pleasure cannot be disposed of so easily. The
ideological effects of war coverage spread to the post-war, and affected the socio-political
3 Available on line at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nt5RZ6ukbNc
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impact of those images. For a public trained in enjoying the spectacle of large scale violence,
the images of the abuses at Abu Ghraib were not construed as visual evidence of the war
crimes committed by the US military and political leaders, but rather as just another piece of
visual  enjoyment.  In  that  instance,  digital  technology  failed  to  express  the  emancipative
potentialities,  because  the  “reality  value”  of  those images  was  eroded by their  “pleasure
value”. It should therefore come as no surprise that the actual consequences of the publication
of  those  images  on  the  perpetrators  of  those  abuses  were  rather  mild  and  inspired  by
“scapegoating” rather than emancipative justice, while the same images are still available on
the web for the visual pleasure of their consumers.
As a note, one may also notice that today the web is still crowded with  images of people re-
enacting the abuses shown in the images of Abu Ghraib. The potential of digital technology,
in this case, seems to go toward the naturalization of abuses and the blurring of distinctions
(e.g. between our pleasure and the “pain of others”4) rather than toward emancipation.5
4.2. Arab Spring 2011: camera as weapons
A commonly held belief is that digital visuality,  and digital technology more broadly,  are
decisive  tools  in  the  democratization  of  the  Arab  countries  in  the  southern  side  the
Mediterranean.  “European  Commissioner  calls  for  ‘digital  champion’ (BBC,  European
commissioner calls for 'digital champions', 2011) and “Syria: ‘Our Weapon is the camera’”
(BBC, Syria: 'Our weapons is the camera', 2011) offer the best examples I could find of this
belief expressed in available media.
My inclination, however, is to think that digital visuality/technology only facilitates the use
of  images,  enhancing  the  political  and  military  value  of  visual  propaganda.  The  social
meaning of these images, and the political effectiveness of their usage, depends on the nature
of ideology and the quality of the organization involved in the struggle respectively. 
In the visual imagery of the Arab Spring, the interesting aspect is the similarities between
these and the “revolutions” of 1989. Someone who is even vaguely familiar with the socio-
cultural features of the populations involved may have the impression that the Arab masses
have been visually socialized into the basic model of French Revolution - as to say that when
people rebel for democracy they all look the same.6 
4 “Regarding the Pain of Others” is the title of a critical essay by Susan Sontag on this topic  (Sontag, 2004
(2003)).
5 see, for example discussion on:
http://www.prostitutionresearch.com/blog/2007/02/kinkcom_in_san_francisco_women.html
For cultural appropriation and subversion see:
http://www.mccullagh.org/photo/1ds-18/abu-ghraib-prisoner-uncle-sam
http://www.likecool.com/Abu_Ghraib_Coffee_Table--Furniture--Home.html
http://www.flickr.com/photos/legofesto/3173782404/
http://www.intomobile.com/2010/08/26/verizon-droid-ad-bears-striking-resemblance-to-abu-ghraib-
torture-images/
http://therecshow.com/richard-simmons-may-be-gay/
http://www.wearemongoloid.com/
6 See e.g. the cartoon by Chappatte for Makingitmagazine, available at http://www.makingitmagazine.net/?
p=3563
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Figure 1: “Les Temps”, by political cartoonist "Chappatte".
We see women carrying guns or participating in street demonstrations, and we construe those
images as signs of gender equality and women emancipation i.e. visual evidence of the spread
of democracy.  We see children and adults with the colors of their national flags painted on
their faces, and we understand that, as supporters of some football team going to an important
match, these people have a strong emotional involvement in their “cause”. Finally, we see the
pictures of the villain – Gadhafi – slayed and humiliated and, besides the emotional “reward”,
we understand that, at least in Libya, the revolution is over and democracy has won. 
When Benjamins observes that film performs training functions for the masses, it means that
masses adopt the visual form of expression to which they have been socialized  – in our case
by films, videogames, internet, etc. When Baudrillard discusses the role of simulacra in the
“regimes of simulation”, it suggests that in these “regimes” visuality is used to hide rather
than show reality. And while we see “them” finally becoming like “us”, we are “shown” the
fulfillment  of  Francis  Fukuyama’s  prophecy  that  “the  institutions  embodying  the  West’s
underlying  principles  of freedom and equality  will  continue  to  spread around the world”
(Fukuyama, 2002, pp. 27-28).
Slovanian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, however, suggests a different possibility:
Unfortunately,  the Egyptian  summer  of  2011 will  be  remembered  as  marking the end  of
revolution, a time when its emancipatory potential was suffocated. Its gravediggers are the
army and the Islamists. … the Islamists will tolerate the army’s material privileges and in
exchange will secure ideological hegemony. The losers will be the pro-Western liberals, too
weak – in spite of the CIA funding they are getting – to ‘promote democracy’, as well as the
true agents of the spring events, the emerging secular left that has been trying to set up a
network of civil society organisations, from trade unions to feminists. The rapidly worsening
economic situation will  sooner or later  bring the poor,  who were  largely absent  from the
spring  protests,  onto  the  streets.  There  is  likely to  be  a new explosion,  and  the  difficult
question for Egypt’s political subjects is who will succeed in directing the rage of the poor?
Who will translate it into a political programme: the new secular left or the Islamists? (Žižek,
2011)7
While the mainstream visual representation of the Arab Spring reflects ideological canons of
appropriateness  and intelligibility,  since  the  beginning,  analysts  have  observed that  these
rebellions may support transitions not towards more democratic regimes but rather toward
fundamentalist Islamic regimes. 
7 For a vehemently critical comment on Žižek’s article see Hamid Dabashi “Zizek and Gaddafi: Living in the
old world” available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/201183113418599933.html
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Is it possible that the same images have different meanings, different political strengths and
ultimately different social  roles if interpreted through different  hierarchies  of values? My
tentative answer to all these questions is ‘yes’. Circulating images of the Arab Spring shows
the progress of democracy for some and the fall of non-islamic Arab regimes for others. To
“us” they show “their” effort to become like “us”. But to “them”, the same images show
“their” sacrifices made for “their” cause. And while those images enter “our” media culture
in forms, timing and shapes crafted to suit the commercial needs of (“our”) media companies,
the same images are metabolized in “their” visual culture as the narrative elements of a new
rebirth  for  the  Arab  Nation.  Images  of  death  and  sacrifice  can  destabilize  conventional
authoritarian regimes to the advantage of the Islamist,  because the death and sacrifice are
construed as proof of the values of their cause. 
The use of digital technology may work for the subversion of “conventional” authoritarian
regimes  (which  are  also  among  the  most  secular  ones  in  that  region)  because  first,  the
ideological  background  of  these  regimes  could  not  “digest”  organized  opposition,  and
second, because the potentialities of this technology were exploited by political organizations
equipped  with  enough  material  and  immaterial  (e.g.  a  recognizable  ideological  identity)
resources  to  make  effective  use  of  them.  The  same  technologies  cannot  subvert  the
inequalities of power in our regimes, because the ideological background of our regimes can
effectively transform “sacrifice” into “entertainment”, the symbolic expression of dissidence
and resistance into cultural commodity and commercial gadgets – just think about the T-shirt
with the face of “Che”! – and therefore neutralize the opposition by taking advantage of it. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper I could not address the idea that digital visuality is influential in supporting
postmodernism as the cultural  logic  of late  capitalism.  What  I  did,  however,  is  offer the
reader speculative evidence of another idea: that the effective emancipative use of material or
immaterial  resources  depends  on  the  availability  of  an  emancipative  ideology.  To  this
purpose,  I  have  defined  ideology  as  an  institutionalized  hierarchy  of  values  performing
descriptive and prescriptive functions. I have argued that the emancipative potential of digital
visuality depends on the development of an ideology antagonistic to that of late capitalism.
Short of this,  the role of digital  visuality and other  forms of communication will  remain
ambivalent or, more commonly, supportive of the hegemonic ideology. 
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